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Abstract
A mean field type differential game is a mathematical model of a large system
of identical agents under mean-field interaction controlled by two players with
opposite purposes. We study the case when the dynamics of each agent is given
by ODE and the players can observe the distribution of the agents. We construct
suboptimal strategies and prove the existence of the value function.
Keywords: mean field type differential games; mean field type control; extremal
shift; programmed iteration method.
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1 Introduction
The paper is concerned with the deterministic mean field type control system gov-
erned by two players. We assume that the purposes of the players are opposite. This
problem can be called zero-sum mean field type differential game.
Originally, the theory of differential games deals with the finite dimensional systems
controlled by two players. It started with the seminal work by Isaacs [24]. The math-
ematical analysis of zero-sum differential games was developed in 1970s (see [4], [21],
[22], [29], [40] and references therein). There are several equivalent approaches to the
formalization of the zero-sum differential games. First one developed by Krasovskii,
Subbotin and their followers (see [29], [36]) presumes that the players are informed
about the current state of the system and form their controls stepwise. Krasovskii and
Subbotin called this approach feedback. However, in fact the realization of such strat-
egy requires a short-term memory. Within the framework of the second approaches
it is assumed that the player’s strategy is a nonanticipative response on a control of
his/her partner [21], [40]. Note that value function of the zero-sum differential game is
a viscosity (minimax) solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equation [4], [36].
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The mean field type control theory is concerned with large systems of agents optimiz-
ing their common payoff in the limit case when the number of agents tends to infinity.
The main assumptions of the mean field approach are: the agents are identical and the
dynamics of each agent depends on his/her state and on the distribution of the states
of other agents. This leads to control problem in the space of probabilities. First mean
field type control problems were considered in [1]. Note that the mean field type control
theory is a counterpart of the mean field game theory proposed in [30], [31], [23]. The
difference between these approaches is that within the framework of mean field games
each agent maximizes his/her outcome.
Nowadays, the mean field type control systems are studied primary for the case of
dynamics given by SDE (see [6] and reference therein). Forward-backward stochastic
differential equation for mean field type control systems were studied in [3], [8], [13].
Dynamic programming principle for these systems was also developed (see [5], [7], [32]).
The existence theorem for the optimal control is proved in [25]. The link between mean
field control theory and Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs in the space of probabilities was studied
in [33], [34]. Additionally, we mention the papers [14], [15], [35] devoted especially to
the deterministic mean field type control problem.
Mean field type differential games arise quite naturally when we examine mean
field type control systems assuming that the dynamics of each agents is affected by a
disturbances. The pursuit-evasion game where a large group of pursuers tries to chase
a large group of evaders can be also treated within the framework of mean field type
differential games. Mean field type differential games can be regarded as continuous-
time dynamical games in the space of probabilities. Such games appear also in the
analysis of differential games with incomplete information [9], [12]. In the last case the
dynamics of the system does not depend explicitly on the probability distribution.
The mean field type differential games were previously considered in [20]. In that
paper the open-loop solution of the differential game was studied for the case when
dynamics is given by SDE.
Aiming to develop the feedback approach to mean field type differential games we
assume that the players are informed about the state of the game. Recall that the
state of the mean field type differential game is a probability describing the current
distribution of all agents. We apply the methodology developed by Krasovskii and
Subbotin to deterministic mean field type differential games. The main idea of this
approach is to
• introduce the notions of u- and v-stability,
• given a u-stable (respectively, v-stable) function, construct a suboptimal strategy
of the first (respectively, second) player
• prove that there exists a value function which is simultaneously u- and v-stable.
In the paper to prove the existence theorem we adapt the programmed iteration method
first proposed in [16], [17], [37]. Originally, programmed iteration method served as an
2
analytical tool for computing the value function of a finite dimensional differential game.
Note that the close construction were used in [10], [11] where the numerical schemes
for differential games were developed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the general definitions
and notations used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we define the feedback strate-
gies, extend the notion of stability to mean field case and formulate the main results.
Section 4 is devoted to the construction of suboptimal strategies based on extremal
shift. Finally, in Section 5 we develop the programmed iteration method for mean field
type differential game and prove the existence theorem for the value function.
2 General notions and definitions
If (X, ρX) is a separable metric space satisfying the Radon property, then denote by
P(X) the set of probabilities on X. Here and below we assume that (X, ρX) is endowed
by Borel σ-algebra. Further, let P2(X) be the set of all probabilities m on X such that,
for some (and, thus, any) x∗ ∈ X,∫
X
ρ2X(x, x∗)m(dx) <∞.
Denote byW2 the 2-Wasserstein metric on P2(X) defined as follows: ifm1, m2 ∈ P2(X),
then
W2(m1, m2) ,
[
inf
π∈Π(m1,m2)
∫
X×X
ρ2X(x1, x2)π(d(x1, x2))
]1/2
.
Here Π(m1, m2) denotes the set of plans between m1, m2, i.e., Π(m1, m2) is a set of
probabilities π ∈ P(X ×X) such that for any measurable Υ ⊂ X π(Υ×X) = m1(Υ),
π(X ×Υ) = m2(Υ).
Note that if X is Polish, then P2(X) is also Polish. The sets P(X), P2(X) coincide
when X is a compact. Moreover, in this case P2(X) is compact and W2 metricizes the
narrow convergence [2].
Now, let (X, ρX) and (Y, ρY ) be separable metric spaces satisfying Radon property.
The function b : X → P(Y ) is called weakly measurable if, for any φ ∈ Cb(X × Y ), the
function
x 7→
∫
Y
φ(x, y)b(x, dy)
is measurable. Here and below we write b(x, dy) instead of b(x)(dy). Denote by
WM(X, Y ) the space of weakly measurable functions b from X to P(Y ). The set
of usual measurable functions is embedded into WM(X, Y ) in the following way: if
h : X → Y is measurable, then put
bh(x) , δh(x). (1)
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Here δy stands for the Dirac measure concentrated in y.
If (Z, ρZ) is also a separable space satisfying the Radon property, ξ ∈ P(Y ), ζ ∈
P(Z) then let ξζ stand for the product of probabilities, i.e., ξζ is a probability on Y ×Z
defined by the rule: for φ ∈ Cb(Y × Z)∫
Y×Z
φ(y, z)(ξη)(d(y, z)) ,
∫
Y
∫
Z
φ(y, z)ξ(dy)ζ(dz).
If b ∈WM(X, Y ), c ∈WM(X,Z), then denote by bc the weakly measurable function
from X to P(Y × Z) given by: for x ∈ X,
(bc)(x, d(y, z)) , b(x, dy)c(x, dz). (2)
Let m be a finite measure on X, b ∈ WM(X, Y ). Denote by m ⋆ b the probability
on X × Y given by the following rule: for φ ∈ Cb(X × Y ),∫
X×Y
φ(x, y)(m ⋆ b)(d(y, z)) ,
∫
X
∫
Y
φ(x, y)b(x, dy)m(dx). (3)
Further, denote by Λ(X,m, Y ) the quotient space of WM(X, Y ) w.r.t. equivalence
given by coincidence m-a.e., i.e., b1 is equivalent to b2 iff m ⋆ b1 = m ⋆ b2. We say that
{bk}∞k=1 converges narrowly to b if {m ⋆ bk} converges narrowly to m ⋆ b, i.e., for any
φ ∈ Cb(X × Y ),∫
X
∫
Y
φ(x, y)bk(x, dy)m(dx)→
∫
X
∫
Y
φ(x, y)b(x, dy)m(dx).
Notice, that if X and Y are Polish, then the space Λ(X, Y,m) is Polish. The set of
measurable functions from X to Y is dense in Λ(X,m, Y ) [41]. Moreover, when X and
Y are metric compact, this property is inherited by Λ(X,m, Y ).
Let π be a measure on X × Y , then denote by π(·|x) (respectively, π(·|y)) the
disintegration of π with respect to its marginal on X (respectively, Y ). We refer to [19,
III.70] for the the existence result of the disintegration of the probability.
If (Ω′,F ′), (Ω′′,F ′′) are measurable spaces, m is a probability on F ′, h : Ω′ → Ω′′ is
measurable, then denote by h#m the push-forward measure: if Υ ∈ F ′′,
(h#m)(Υ) , m(h
−1(Υ)).
For simplicity we assume periodic boundary conditions, i.e., the phase space is
T
d , Rd/Zd. This means that each element x ∈ Td is an equivalence class [x′] , {y′ ∈
R
d : y′ ∼ x′}, where x′ ∼ y′ iff x′ − y′ ∈ Zd. The function
T
d × Td ∋ (x, y) 7→ ‖x− y‖ , min{‖x′ − y′‖ : x′ ∈ x, y′ ∈ y}
provides the metric on Td.
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Denote by C the space C([0, T ],Td). With some abuse of notation, for x(·), y(·) ∈ C,
we set
‖x(·)− y(·)‖ , max
t∈[0,T ]
‖x(t)− y(t)‖.
Further, for t ∈ [0, T ], denote by et the evaluation operator from C to Td defined by the
following rule: if x(·) ∈ C, then
et(x(·)) , x(t).
Since, for every x(·), y(·) ∈ C, ‖et(x(·))− et(y(·)))‖ ≤ ‖x(·)− y(·)‖, we have that if
χ1, χ2 ∈ P2(C), t ∈ [0, T ], then
W2(et#χ1, et#χ2) ≤W2(χ1, χ2). (4)
Below we call any function of time taking values in P2(Td) a flow of probabilities.
Denote by M the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] to P2(Td). Further, let MR
denote the set of flows of probabilities m(·) ∈M such that
W2(m(t
′), m(t′′)) ≤ R|t′ − t′′|.
Assume that the motion of each agent is given by the ordinary differential equation
d
dt
x(t) = f(t, x(t), m(t), u(t, x(t), m(t)), v(t, x(t), m(t))),
t ∈ [0, T ], x(t) ∈ Td, m(t) ∈ P2(Td),
u(t, x(t), m(t)) ∈ U, v(t, x(t), m(t)) ∈ V.
(5)
Here m(t) stands for the distribution of all agents; U (respectively, V ) denotes
the control space of the first (receptively, second) player; f is a function defined on
[0, T ]×Td ×P2(Td)×U × V with values in Rd. Integrating formally (5), we can write
down the equation on m(t) in the following form:
d
dt
m(t) = 〈f(t, ·, m(t), u(t, ·, m(t)), v(t, ·, m(t))),∇〉m(t).
Here · stands for x.
We assume that the controls u(t, x,m) (respectively, v(t, x,m)) are chosen by the
first (respectively, second) player to minimize (respectively, maximize) the objective
function
g(m(T )).
We assume that
• the control sets U and V are metric compacts;
• the functions f and g are continuous;
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• the function f is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t x and m;
• the Isaacs condition holds true: for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Td, m ∈ P2(Td), w ∈ Rd:
min
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈w, f(t, x,m, u, v)〉 = max
v∈V
min
u∈U
〈w, f(t, x,m, u, v)〉.
In the paper we use relaxed controls.
Let U , Λ([0, T ], λ, U), V , Λ([0, T ], λ, V ) be space of relaxed controls of the first
and second players respectively. Here λ stands for the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ].
Denote by U0 (respectively, V0) the set of measurable functions from [0, T ] to U (re-
spectively, V ). Notice that an element of U (respectively V ) can be regarded as a
contant control of the first (respectively, second) player. Using this and the embedding
given by (1), we assume that
U ⊂ U0 ⊂ U , V ⊂ V0 ⊂ V. (6)
Denote by W the set of joint relaxed controls of both players on [0, T ], i.e., W ,
Λ([0, T ], λ, U × V ). Further, using (2), without loss of generality we assume that
U × V ⊂ W.
If s ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ Td, m(·) ∈M, η ∈ W, then denote by x(·, s, y,m(·), η) the solution
of the initial value problem
d
dt
x(t) =
∫
U×V
f(t, x(t), m(t), u, v)η(t, d(u, v)), x(s) = y. (7)
Note that x(·, s, y,m(·), η) is a motion of a representative player produced by the relaxed
control of both players η.
Further, given s ∈ [0, T ], m(·) ∈ M, denote by trajsm(·) : Td ×W → C the operator
which assigns to each pair (y, η) the motion x(·, s, y,m(·), η).
Now let us introduce the sets of distributions of controls. Put
A , WM(Td,U), B , WM(Td,V), D , WM(Td,W).
The set A (respectively, B) is the set of distributions of relaxed controls of the first
(respectively, second) player; while D is the set of distributions of joint relaxed controls
of both players.
In some cases we will assume that the players use constant controls. Let Ac ,
WM(Td, U) denote the set of distributions of constant controls of the first player; and
let Bc , WM(Td, V ) be the set distributions of constant controls of the second player.
Due to identification of measurable control with the corresponding relaxed control
(see (6)) we get
Ac ⊂ A, Bc ⊂ B.
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If α ∈ A, then denote by D1[α] the set of distributions κ ∈ WM(Td,U × V) such
that, for any x ∈ Td, the marginal distribution of κ(x) on U is α(x). Informally
speaking, elements of D1[α] are distribution of controls of both players consistent with
the distribution of the first player’s controls α. Further, let D01[α] be the set of κ ∈ D1[α]
such that κ(x) is concentrated on U ×V0, i.e., in this case we admit only usual controls
of the second player. Analogously, let D2[β] (respectively, D02[β]) denote the set of
κ ∈ WM(Td,U × V) (respectively, κ ∈ WM(Td,U0 × V)) such that, for each x ∈ Td,
the marginal distribution of κ(x) on V is β(x).
Definition 1. Let s ∈ [0, T ], m∗ ∈ P2(Td), κ ∈ D. We say thatm(·) = m(·, s,m∗,κ) ∈
M is a flow of probabilities generated by distribution of joint relaxed controls of the
players κ if there exists a probability γ ∈ P2(C) such that
m(t) = et#γ, m(s) = m∗,
and,
γ = trajsm(·)#(m∗ ⋆ κ).
The existence and uniqueness theorem for the flow of probabilities is a slight revision
of [38, Theorem I.1.1] (see also [26, Theorem 7.11]).
3 Main result
We consider the concept of feedback strategies going back to formalization of zero-
sum differential games proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin. In this case the original
differential game is replaced with the couple of games, namely, upper and lower games.
In the upper game the first player uses feedback strategy and forms his control stepwise,
when the second player forms his control arbitrarily. In the lower game the players
change their places. If the upper and lower value functions coincide, then we say that
there exists a value function of the original game.
The strategy of the first player is a function u : [0, T ]×P2(Td)→ Ac. Analogously,
any function v : [0, T ]× P2(Td)→ Bc is called a strategy of the second player.
Let us start with the upper game. Let u be a strategy of the first player, t0 ∈ [0, T ]
be an initial time, m0 ∈ P2(Td) be an initial distribution of players, and let ∆ = {ti}Ni=0
be a partition of [t0, T ].
Definition 2. We say that a flow of probabilities m(·) : [t0, T ] → P2(Td) is gen-
erated by t0, m0, u and ∆ if m(t0) = m0 and there exist distributions of controls
κi ∈ D01[u[ti, m(ti)]], i = 0, . . . , N − 1, such that, for t ∈ [ti, ti+1], i = 0, . . . , N − 1,
m(t) = m(t, ti, m(ti),κi).
We denote the set of flows of probabilities generated by t0, m0, u, and ∆ by
X1(t0, m0, u,∆).
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If the first player uses the strategy u and corrects his/her control at times of partition
∆, then his/her outcome is evaluated by the value
J1(t0, m0, u,∆) , sup{g(m(T )) : m(·) ∈ X1(t0, m0, u,∆)}.
Analogously, if t0 is an initial time, m0 is an initial distribution of players, v is a sec-
ond player’s strategy, ∆ is a partition of the time interval [t0, T ], one can introduce the
set of flows of probabilities generated by t0, m0, ∆ and v. Denote it by X2(t0, m0, v,∆).
The value
J2(t0, m0, v,∆) , inf{g(m(T )) : m(·) ∈ X2(t0, m0, v,∆)}
provides an evaluation of the outcome when the system starts at (t0, m0) and the second
player chooses the strategy v and the partition ∆.
The upper value of the game at (t0, m0) is equal to
Γ1(t0, m0) , inf
u,∆
J1(t0, m0, u,∆).
The lower value of the game is defined in the same way:
Γ2(t0, m0) , sup
v,∆
J2(t0, m0, v,∆).
Clearly,
Γ1 ≥ Γ2.
If Γ1 = Γ2, then we say that the game has a value.
To formulate the main result we require a notions of u- and v- stability.
Definition 3. We say that a lower semicontinuous function ψ1 : [0, T ]× P2(Td) → R
is u-stable if
• for any m ∈ P2(Td), g(m) ≤ ψ1(T,m);
• for any s, r ∈ [0, T ], s < r, m∗ ∈ P2(Td), β ∈ Bc, there exists a distribution of
players’ controls κ ∈ D2[β] such that
ψ1(s,m∗) ≥ ψ1(r,m(r, s,m∗,κ)).
Definition 4. An upper semicontinuous function ψ2 : [0, T ] × P2(Td) → R is called
v-stable if
• for any m ∈ P2(Td), g(m) ≥ ψ2(T,m)
• for any s, r ∈ [0, T ], s < r, m∗ ∈ P2(Td), α ∈ Ac, there exists a distribution of
players’ controls κ ∈ D1[α] such that
ψ2(s,m∗) ≤ ψ2(r,m(r, s,m∗,κ)).
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Theorem 1. Let ψ1 be a u-stable function, then, for any (t0, m0) ∈ [0, T ]×P2(Td),
Γ1(t0, m0) ≤ ψ1(t0, m0).
If ψ2 is a v-stable function, then
Γ2(t0, m0) ≥ ψ2(t0, m0).
One way to prove the existence and compute the value function is the programmed
iteration method first proposed for zero-sum differential game by Chentsov [16].
Let R[0,T ]×P
2(Td) denote the set of all functions from [0, T ]× P2(Td) to R.
Define the operator Φ : R[0,T ]×P
2(Td) → R[0,T ]×P2(Td) by the following rule: if ω ∈
R
[0,T ]×P2(Td), s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td), then
Φ[ω](s, µ) , sup
r∈[s,T ]
sup
β∈Bc
inf
κ∈D2[β]
ω(r,m(r, s, µ,κ)).
Let
ω0(s, µ) , sup
β∈Bc
inf
κ∈D2[β]
g(m(T, s, µ,κ)). (8)
Further, for k = 1, 2, . . ., set
ωk , Φ[ωk−1]. (9)
Analogously, let us introduce the operator Ψ : R[0,T ]×P
2(Td) → R[0,T ]×P2(Td) by
Ψ[ω](s, µ) , inf
r∈[s,T ]
inf
α∈Ac
sup
κ∈D1[α]
ω(r,m(r, s, µ,κ)).
Put
ω0(s, µ) , inf
α∈Ac
sup
κ∈D1[α]
g(m(T, s, µ,κ)), (10)
ωk , Ψ[ωk−1]. (11)
Theorem 2. There exists a value function of the mean field type differential game Γ.
It is simultaneously u- and v-stable. For any s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td),
Γ(s, µ) = lim
k→∞
ωk(s, µ) = lim
k→∞
ωk(s, µ).
4 Extremal shift rule
In this section we prove Theorem 1. To this end, given the u-stable function ψ1
and ε > 0, we construct the strategy uε such that, for a sufficiently fine partition, the
corresponding outcome is estimated by ψ1 with an error vanishing when ε→ 0.
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Since the function f is continuous, the sets Td, P2(Td), U , V are compact, there
exists a constant C0 such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Td, m ∈ P2(Td), u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x,m, u, v)‖ ≤ C0. (12)
Therefore, for all s ∈ [0, T ], m∗ ∈ P2(Td), κ ∈ D, m(·, s,m∗,κ) ∈MC0.
Let the functions ̟f , ̟g : R → [0,+∞) be vanishing at 0, continuous at 0 and
satisfy
‖f(t, x,m, u, v)− f(t′, x,m, u, v)‖ ≤ ̟f(t− t′),
|g(m)− g(m′)| ≤ ̟g(W2(m,m′))
for any t, t′ ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Td, m,m′ ∈ P2(Td), u ∈ U , v ∈ V . Without loss of generality,
one can assume that ̟f , ̟g are nondecreasing on [0,+∞). Moreover, we assume that
̟f is even. Further, denote by L the Lipschitz constant for the function f , i.e., for any
t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Td, m,m′ ∈ P2(Td), u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x,m, u, v)− f(t, x′, m′, u, v)‖ ≤ L‖x− x′‖+ LW2(m,m′).
Set
̟1(ε) , 2
√
d̟f(ε) + 4
√
dLC0ε, (13)
̟2(ε) , 2̟1(ε) + 4C
2
0ε. (14)
Let ρ(ε, t) be equal to
̺(ε, t) , (ε+̟2(ε)t)e
4Lt. (15)
Given s ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈ Td, m ∈ P2(Td), pick
uˆ(s, x, y,m) ∈ argmin
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈x′ − y′, f(s, x,m, u, v)〉,
vˆ(s, x, y,m) ∈ argmax
v∈V
min
u∈U
〈x′ − y′, f(s, x,m, u, v)〉.
Here x′ ∈ x, y′ ∈ y are such that ‖x′ − y′‖ = ‖x− y‖. Notice that one can choose the
function uˆ and vˆ to be measurable.
The strategy uε introduced below realizes the extremal shift rule initially proposed
for finite dimensional differential games in [29]. We adapt for the mean field case the
variant of this method borrowed from [28]. Let (s,m) be a position from [0, T ]×P2(Td).
Let ν ∈ P2(Td) be such that W 22 (m, ν) ≤ ̺(ε, s) and
ψ1(s, ν) = min{ψ1(s,m′) : m′ ∈ P2(Td), W 22 (m,m′) ≤ ̺(ε, s)}.
Now, let π be an optimal plan between m and ν, π(·|x) be its disintegration with respect
tom. Define the first player’s strategy uε by the rule: for s ∈ [0, T ],m ∈ P2(Td), x ∈ Td,
put
uε[s,m](x) , uˆ(s, x, ·, m)#π(·|x). (16)
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By construction we have that uε[s,m] ∈ Ac.
Below we use the following unfolding of the solution of (7). If t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd,
m ∈ P2(Td), u ∈ U , v ∈ V , then put
f˜(t, x′, m, u, v) , f(t, [x′], m, u, v).
Let s ∈ [0, T ], y′ ∈ Rd, m(·) ∈ M, η ∈ W. Denote by x˜(·, s, y′, m(·), η) the solution
of initial value problem in Rd
d
dt
x˜(t) =
∫
U×V
f˜(t, x˜(t), m(t), u, v)η(d(u, v)), x˜(s) = y′. (17)
Notice that if x˜(·) solves (17), then x(·) given by x(t) , [x˜(t)] solves (7) for y = [y′].
Furthermore, the definition of f˜ and (12) yield
‖x˜(t, s, y′, m(·), η)− y′‖ ≤ C0(t− s). (18)
Lemma 1. Let s, r ∈ [0, T ], s ≤ r, x∗, y∗ ∈ Td, m(·), ν(·) ∈ MC0, u∗ =
uˆ(s, x∗, y∗, m(s)), v
∗ = vˆ(s, x∗, y∗, m(s)), ξ ∈ U , ζ ∈ V, x(·) = x(·, s, x∗, m(·), δu∗ζ),
y(·) = x(·, s, y∗, ν(·), ξδv∗). Then
‖x(r)− y(r)‖2 ≤ ‖x∗ − y∗‖2(1 + 3L(r − s))
+ LW 22 (m(s), ν(s))(r − s) +̟2(r − s) · (r − s).
Here ̟2 is introduced by (14).
Proof. Pick x′∗ ∈ x∗ and y′∗ ∈ y∗ such that
‖x∗ − y∗‖ = ‖x′∗ − y′∗‖
and
uˆ(s, x∗, y∗, m) ∈ argmin
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, x∗, m, u, v)〉,
vˆ(s, x∗, y∗, m) ∈ argmax
v∈V
min
u∈U
〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, x∗, m, u, v)〉.
Denote
x˜(t) , x˜(t, s, x′∗, m(·), δu∗ζ), y˜(t) , x˜(t, s, y′∗, ν(·), ξδv∗).
Using (18), we get
‖x(r)− y(r)‖2 ≤ ‖x˜(r)− y˜(r)‖2
≤ ‖x′∗ − y′∗‖2 + ‖x˜(r)− x′∗‖2 + ‖y˜(r)− y′∗‖2
− 2〈x˜(r)− x′∗, y˜(r)− y′∗〉
+ 2〈x′∗ − y′∗, x˜(r)− x′∗〉 − 2〈x′∗ − y′∗, y˜(r)− y′∗〉
≤ ‖x′∗ − y′∗‖2 + 4C20(r − s)2
+ 2〈x′∗ − y′∗, x˜(r)− x∗〉 − 2〈x′∗ − y′∗, y˜(r)− y′∗〉.
(19)
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Using Lipschitz continuity of the function f w.r.t. x and m, the definition of f˜ ,
estimate (18), the inequality ‖x′∗ − y′∗‖ ≤
√
d and the fact that m(·), ν(·) ∈ MC0, we
conclude that
〈x′∗ − y′∗, x˜(r)− x′∗〉 − 〈x′∗ − y′∗, y˜(r)− y′∗〉
=
〈
x′∗ − y′∗,
∫ r
s
∫
V
f˜(t, x˜(t), m(t), u∗, v)ζ(t, dv)dt
〉
−
〈
x′∗ − y′∗,
∫ r
s
∫
U
f˜(t, y˜(t), ν(t), u, v∗)ξ(t, du)dt
〉
≤
∫ r
s
∫
V
〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, x∗, m(s), u∗, v)ζ(t, dv)〉dt
−
∫ r
s
∫
U
〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, y∗, ν(s), u, v∗)ξ(t, du)〉dt
+̟1(r − s) · (r − s).
(20)
Here ̟1 is defined by (13)
For each u ∈ U , v ∈ V , the following inequality holds:
〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, x∗, m(s), u∗, v)〉 − 〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, y∗, ν(s), u, v∗)〉
≤ 〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, x∗, m(s), u∗, v)〉 − 〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, x∗, m(s), u, v∗)〉
+
3L
2
‖x∗ − y∗‖2 + L
2
W 22 (m(s), ν(s)).
Using the choice of u∗ and v
∗, we get
〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, x∗, m(s), u∗, v)〉 − 〈x′∗ − y′∗, f(s, y∗, ν(s), u, v∗)〉
≤ 3L
2
‖x∗ − y∗‖2 + L
2
W 22 (m(s), ν(s)).
Combining this, (19), (20) and definition of ̟2 (see (14)), we get the conclusion of the
Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let s, r ∈ [0, T ], s ≤ r, m∗, ν∗ ∈ P2(Td), π be an optimal plan between
m∗ and ν∗, π(·|x), π(·|y) be its disintegration with respect to m∗ and ν∗ respectively,
α∗(x) , uˆ(s, x, ·, m∗)#π(·|x), β∗(y) , vˆ(s, ·, y,m∗)#π(·|y), κ ∈ D1[α∗], ϑ ∈ D2[β∗],
m(·) = m(·, s,m∗,κ), ν(·) = m(·, s, ν∗, ϑ). Then
W 22 (m(r), ν(r)) ≤W 22 (m∗, ν∗)(1 + 4L(r − s)) +̟2(r − s) · (r − s).
Proof. Since α∗ ∈ Ac = WM(Td, U), κ ∈ D1[α∗], we have that, for each x ∈ Td, there
exists a disintegration of κ(x) with respect to α∗(x) that is an element of WM(U,V).
With some abuse of notation denote it by κ(x, u). Analogously, let ϑ(x, v) stand for
the disintegration of ϑ(x) with respect to β∗(x).
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Further, set
κˆ(x∗, y∗) , κ(x∗, uˆ(s, x∗, y∗, m∗)), (21)
ϑˆ(x∗, y∗) , ϑ(x∗, vˆ(s, x∗, y∗, m∗)). (22)
Notice that, for each x∗, y∗ ∈ Td, κˆ(x∗, y∗) ∈ P(V), ϑˆ(x∗, y∗) ∈ P(U).
Let Ξ be a probability on Td × Td × U × V × U × V defined by the following rule:
for φ ∈ Cb(Td × Td × U × V × U × V),∫
Td×Td×U×V×U×V
φ(x, y, ξ′, ζ ′, ξ′′, ζ ′′)Ξ(d(x, y, ξ′, ζ ′, ξ′′, ζ ′′))
,
∫
Td×Td
∫
U
∫
V
φ(x∗, y∗, δuˆ(s,x∗,y∗,m∗), ζ
′, ξ′′, δvˆ(s,x∗,y∗,m∗))
κˆ(x∗, y∗, dζ
′)ϑˆ(x∗, y∗, dξ
′′)π(d(x∗, y∗)).
(23)
Obviously, the marginal distribution of Ξ on Td × Td is π.
To clarify the link between the probability Ξ and the distributions of controls κ and
ϑ let us introduce the following projection of Td ×Td ×U ×V ×U ×V on Td ×U ×V:
• P1(x∗, y∗, ξ′, ζ ′, ξ′′, ζ ′′) , (x∗, ξ′, ζ ′);
• P2(x∗, y∗, ξ′, ζ ′, ξ′′, ζ ′′) , (y∗, ξ′′, ζ ′′).
We have that
P1#Ξ = m∗ ⋆ κ, P
2
#Ξ = ν∗ ⋆ ϑ. (24)
Let T r,sm(·),ν(·) be the operator from Td × Td × U × V × U × V to Td × Td defined by:
T r,sm(·),ν(·)(x′, x′′, ξ′, ζ ′, ξ′′, ζ ′′)
, (er(traj
s
m(·)(x
′, ξ′ζ ′)), er(traj
s
ν(·)(x
′′, ξ′′ζ ′′))).
(25)
This, (24) and Definition 1 yield that
πˆ , T r,sm(·),ν(·)#Ξ
is a plan between m(r) and ν(r). To simplify notation put
xˆ(x∗, y∗, ζ) , x(r, s, x∗, m(·), δuˆ(s,x∗,y∗,m∗)ζ), (26)
yˆ(x∗, y∗, ξ) , x(r, s, y∗, ν(·), ξδvˆ(s,x∗,y∗,m∗)). (27)
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Using (23), (25) and definition of πˆ, we get
W 22 (m(r), ν(r)) ≤
∫
Td×Td
‖x− y‖2πˆ(d(x, y))
=
∫
Td×Td×U×V×U×V
‖x(r, s, x∗, m(·), ξ′ζ ′)− x(r, s, y∗, ν(·), ξ′′ζ ′′)‖2
Ξ(d(x∗, y∗, ξ
′, ζ ′, ξ′′, ζ ′′))
=
∫
Td×Td
∫
U
∫
V
‖xˆ(x∗, y∗, ζ)− yˆ(x∗, y∗, ξ)‖2
κˆ(x∗, y∗, dζ)ϑˆ(x∗, y∗, dξ)π(d(x∗, y∗)).
Since m(·), ν(·) ∈ MC0 , taking into account designations (26), (27), one can estimate
‖xˆ(x∗, y∗, ζ)− yˆ(x∗, y∗, ξ)‖2 by Lemma 1. This implies the inequality
W 22 (m(r), ν(r)) ≤ (1+3L(r − s))
∫
Td×Td
‖x∗ − y∗‖2π(d(x∗, y∗))
+ LW 22 (m(s), ν(s))(r − s) +̟2(r − s) · (r − s).
Since π is an optimal plan between m∗ and ν∗ we obtain the conclusion of the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let t0 ∈ [0, T ], m0 ∈ P2(Td), ∆ = {ti}Ni=0 be a partition of [t0, T ].
Assume that d(∆) ≤ ε. As usual, d(∆) stands for the fineness of ∆.
Let m(·) ∈ X1(t0, m0, uε,∆). Denote mi , m(ti). Recall (see (16)) that the strategy
uε[ti, mi] is determined by the rule: if x ∈ Td,
uε[ti, mi](x) = α
∗
i (x, ·) = uˆ(ti, x, ·, mi)#πi(·|x).
Here πi is an optimal plan between mi and νi; while νi is a probability on P2(Td) such
that
νi ∈ argmin
m:W 2
2
(mi,m)≤̺(ε,ti)
ψ1(ti, m).
Since m(·) ∈ X1(t0, m0, uε,∆), there exists a sequence of distributions κi ∈ D, i =
0, . . . , N − 1 such that κi ∈ D01[α∗i ] and, for t ∈ [ti, ti+1],
m(t) = m(t, ti, mi,κi).
Further, for y ∈ Td, set
β∗i (y, ·) = vˆ(ti, ·, y,mi)#πi(·|y).
We have that there exists a distribution of controls ϑi ∈ D2[β∗i ] such that, for νi(·) ,
m(·, ti, νi, ϑi),
ψ1(ti, νi) ≥ ψ1(ti+1, ν(ti+1)). (28)
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Using Lemma 2, we get
W 22 (m(ti+1), νi(ti+1)) ≤ ̺(ε, ti+1). (29)
From (28) and Definition 3 we conclude that
ψ1(t0, m0) ≥ ψ1(t0, ν0) ≥ ψ1(t1, ν0(t1)) ≥ ψ1(t1, ν1)
≥ . . . ≥ ψ1(tN , νN−1(tN)) ≥ g(νN−1(tN)).
Using (29) and the definition of ̺ (see (15)), we obtain the following estimate:
g(m(T )) ≤ g(νN−1(T )) +̟g(W2(m(T ), νN−1(T )))
≤ ψ1(t0, m0) +̟g(̺1/2(ε, T )).
Thus, for any partition ∆ such that d(∆) ≤ ε,
J1(t0, m0, uε,∆) ≤ ψ1(t0, m0) +̟g(̺1/2(ε, T )).
Since ̟g(̺
1/2(ε, T ))→ 0 as ε→ 0, we get
Γ1(t0, m0) ≤ ψ1(t0, m0).
This proves the first statement of the theorem. To prove the second part it suffices to
replace g with −g and interchange the players.
5 Programmed iteration method
This section is concerned with the proof of Theorem 2. First, let us prove the
following auxiliary statement.
Lemma 3. Let {si} ⊂ [0, T ], {µi} ∈ P2(Td), s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td), β ∈ Bc. Assume
that si → s, W2(µi, µ) → 0 as i → ∞. Then there exists a sequence {βi}∞i=1 ⊂ Bc
satisfying the following properties:
1. {µi ⋆ βi} converges narrowly to µ ⋆ β;
2. if κi ∈ D2[βi], then there exist κ ∈ D2[β] and a subsequence {il} such that, for
mil(·) , m(·, sil, µil,κil) and m(·) , m(·, s, µ,κ),
lim
l→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
W2(mil(t), m(t)) = 0.
Moreover, if µi = µ, then one can choose βi = β.
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Proof. First, let us construct βi. Let πi ∈ Π(µ, µi) be an optimal plan between µ and µi.
Further, let πi(·|x′) be its disintegration with respect to µi. Define βi by the following
rule: for x′ ∈ Td and φ ∈ Cb(V ), put∫
V
φ(v)βi(x
′, dv) ,
∫
Td
∫
V
φ(v)β(x, dv)πi(dx|x′). (30)
Let us prove that µi ⋆ βi converges narrowly to µ ⋆ β. It suffices to prove that if
φ ∈ Cb(Td × V ) is 1-Lipschitz continuous, then∫
Td×V
φ(x′, v)(µi ⋆ βi)(d(x
′, v))→
∫
Td×V
φ(x, v)(µ ⋆ β)(d(x, v)).
Since πi is an optimal plan between µ and µi, by (30) we have that∣∣∣∫
Td×V
φ(x′, v)(µi ⋆ βi)(d(x
′, v))−
∫
Td×V
φ(x, v)(µ ⋆ β)(d(x, v))
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∫
Td×Td
∫
V
φ(x′, v)β(x, dv)πi(d(x, x
′))
−
∫
Td×Td
∫
V
φ(x, v)β(x, dv)πi(d(x, x
′))
∣∣∣
≤
∫
Td×Td
∫
V
|φ(x′, v)− φ(x, v)|β(x, dv)πi(d(x, x′))
≤
∫
Td×Td
‖x− x′‖πi(d(x, x′)) ≤W2(µ, µi).
(31)
This proves the first statement of the lemma. By construction we have that βi = β
when µi = µ.
Now, let κi ∈ D2[βi]. We have that τi , µi ⋆ κi is a probability on compact set
T
d×U ×V . Thus, there exist a subsequence {il} and a probability τ ∈ P(Td×U ×V )
such that {τil} converges narrowly to τ . Since the marginal distribution of τi on Td×V
is µi ⋆ βi and µi ⋆ βi → µ ⋆ β we conclude that the marginal distribution of τ on Td× V
is µ⋆β. Put κ equal to disintegration of τ with respect to µ. Without loss of generality
one can assume that κ ∈ D2[β].
Recall that
mi(·) , m(·, si, µi,κi).
Set
trajl , traj
sil
mil (·)
, τ l , τil, γ
l , trajl #τ
l.
Since the probabilities {γl} are concentrated on the set of C0-Lipschtitz continuous
functions from [0, T ] to Td which is a compact subset of C, {γl} is relatively compact
in P(C). Without loss of generality we can assume that {γl} itself converges narrowly
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to some γ ∈ P(C). Moreover, γ is concentrated on the set of C0-Lipschitz continuous
functions from [0, T ] to Td.
Put ν(t) , et#γ. By (4) we have that
lim
l→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
W2(mil(t), ν(t)) = 0.
It remains to prove that
ν(·) = m(·) , m(·, s, µ,κ).
To this end let us show that ν(s) = µ and γ = traj∗ #τ , where traj
∗ , trajsν(·) .
Since mil(sil) = µi and W2(mil(s), mil(sil)) ≤ C0|s− sil|, we get that ν(s) = µ.
Further, we have that, for any y ∈ Td, η ∈ W,
‖ trajl(y, η)− traj∗(y, η)‖ → 0 as l →∞.
The compactness of Td and W implies that
‖ trajl− traj∗ ‖ , sup
y∈Td
sup
η∈W
‖ trajl(y, η)− traj∗(y, η)‖ → 0. (32)
Let φ ∈ Cb(C). Without loss of generality we can consider only the case when φ is
1-Lipschitz continuous. We have that∣∣∣∫
C
φ(x(·))γl(d(x(·)))−
∫
C
φ(x(·))(traj∗ #τ)(d(x(·)))
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∫
C
φ(x(·))(trajl #τ l)(d(x(·)))−
∫
C
φ(x(·))(traj∗ #τ)(d(x(·)))
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∫
Td×W
φ(trajl(y, η))τ l(d(y, η))−
∫
Td×W
φ(traj∗(y, η))τ(d(y, η))
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∫
Td×W
φ(trajl(y, η))τ l(d(y, η))−
∫
Td×W
φ(traj∗(y, η))τ l(d(y, η))
+
∫
Td×W
φ(traj∗(y, η))τ l(d(y, η))−
∫
Td×W
φ(traj∗(y, η))τ(d(y, η))
∣∣∣
≤ ‖ trajl− traj∗ ‖
+
∣∣∣∫
Td×W
φ(traj∗(y, η))τ l(d(y, η))−
∫
Td×W
φ(traj∗(y, η))τ(d(y, η))
∣∣∣.
Using (32) and the fact that τ l converges narrowly to τ we get that γl → traj∗ #τ .
At the same time γl converges to γ. Thus, γ = traj∗ #τ . Taking into account the
equality τ = µ ⋆ κ we obtain the second statement of the lemma.
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The following lemmas are concerned with the sequences {ωk} and {ωk} Recall that
{ωk} is defined by (8) and (9), whereas the sequence {ωk} is given by (10), (11).
Denote by LCF (respectively, UCF) the set of all lower (respectively, upper) semi-
countinuous functions from [0, T ]× P2(Td) to R.
Lemma 4. For any k ∈ N ∪ {0},
ωk ∈ LCF, ωk ∈ UCF
Proof. We prove only the statement that ω0 ∈ LCF, as the statements for ωk, k ∈ N
and ωk can be obtained similarly. Let si → s, µi → µ. Given ε > 0, there exists βε
such that
ω0(s, µ) ≤ inf
κ∈D2[βε]
g(m(T, s, µ,κ)) + ε. (33)
Let a sequence of distributions {βε,i} ⊂ Bc be such that µi ⋆ βε,i converges narrowly to
µ ⋆ βε. The existence of this sequence is ensured by Lemma 3. Obviously,
ω0(si, µi) ≥ inf
κ∈D2[βε,i]
g(m(T, si, µi,κ)).
Choose κε,i ∈ D2[βε,i] satisfying
ω0(si, µi) ≥ g(m(T, si, µi,κε,i))− ε.
By Lemma 3 and the continuity of g there exists a distribution of controls κε ∈
D2[βε] such that
lim inf
i→∞
ω0(si, µi) ≥ g(m(T, s, µ,κε))− ε.
Using (33), we get
lim inf
i→∞
ω0(si, µi) ≥ ω0(s, µ)− 2ε.
Passing to the limit when ε→ 0, we conclude that the function ω0 is lower semicontin-
uous.
Lemma 5. There exists a limit
ω∗(s, µ) , lim
k→∞
ωk(s, µ) <∞.
The function ω∗ is u-stable.
Proof. First, notice that
ωk+1(s, µ) ≥ ωk(s, µ). (34)
Moreover,
ωk(s, µ) ≤ sup
κ∈D
g(m(T, s, µ,κ)) <∞.
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This and (34) imply that the function ω∗ is well-defined and proper. Since the functions
ωk are lower semicontinuous (see Lemma 4), ω∗ is also lower semicontinuous.
Further, for all k ∈ N,
ω∗(T, µ) = ωk(T, µ) = g(T, µ).
It remains to prove that, for any s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td), β ∈ Bc, r ∈ [s, T ], there
exists a distribution of controls κ ∈ D2[β] such that
ω∗(s, µ) ≥ ω∗(r,m(r, s, µ,κ)). (35)
Given s, r ∈ [0, T ], s < r, µ ∈ P2(Td) and β ∈ Bc, let κk ∈ D2[β] be such that
ωk(s, µ) ≥ ωk−1(r,m(r, s, µ,κk))− 1
k
. (36)
Using Lemma 3, we get that there exists a sequence {κkl} and a distribution of controls
κ∗ ∈ D2[β] such that
W2(m(r, s, µ,κkl), m(r, s, µ,κ∗))→ 0.
Since the functions ωk and ω∗ are lower semicontinuous, the definition of ω∗ means
that
epi(ω∗) =
∞⋂
k=0
epi(ωk) =
∞⋂
l=1
epi(ωkl−1). (37)
Hereinafter, epi(ϕ) stands for the epigraph of the functions ϕ. Moreover, the set epi(ω∗)
is closed.
If we denote zl , ωkl(s, µ), z
∗ , ω∗(s, µ), ν
l , m(r, s, µ,κkl), ν
∗ , m(r, s, µ,κ∗),
then (36) implies that
dist((r, νl, zl), epi(ωkl−1)) ≤
1
kl
. (38)
Here dist stands for the distance between a point and a set. Passing to the limit in
(38), and using equality (37), we get that
dist((r, ν∗, z∗), epi(ω∗)) = 0.
This is equivalent to (35).
Lemma 5 and Theorem 1 immediately imply
Corollary 1. For any s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td),
Γ1(s, µ) ≤ ω∗(s, µ).
The following statement is concerned with the sequence of functions {ωk}∞k=0 intro-
duced by (10) and (11).
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Lemma 6. For any s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td), the limit
ω∗(s, µ) , lim
k→∞
ωk(s, µ)
is well-defined. The function ω∗ is v-stable and
Γ2(s, µ) ≥ ω∗(s, µ), s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td).
The proof of this Lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5 and Corollary 1. To
prove the lemma it suffices to replace g with −g and interchange the players.
The further construction requires the formalization of the mean field type differential
game in the class of strategies with memory.
Let Ms denote the set of continuous functions m(·) : [s, T ]→ P2(Td).
Definition 5. Let s ∈ [0, T ]. We say that a function p : [s, T ] × Ms → Ac is a
stepwise strategy with memory of the first player on [s, T ] if there exists a partition
∆ = {ti}Ni=0 of [s, T ] such that, for any m′(·), m′′(·) ∈ Ms and t ∈ [s, T ], the property
that t ∈ [ti, ti+1), m′(t0) = m′′(t0), . . . , m′(ti) = m′′(ti) implies the equality
p[t,m′(·)] = p[ti, m′(·)] = p[t,m′′(·)] = p[ti, m′′(·)].
Definition 6. Let s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td), p be a stepwise strategy with memory of
the first player on [s, T ]. Moreover, assume that the partition of [s, T ] ∆ = {ti}Ni=0
determines p. The flow of probabilities m(·) is called generated by s, µ and p if there
exist distributions of controls κi ∈ D such that m(s) = µ and, for i = 0, . . . , n − 1,
t ∈ [ti, ti+1),
m(t) = m(t, ti, m(ti),κi), κi ∈ D01[p[ti, m(·)]].
Denote the set of flows of probabilities generated by s, µ and p by X̂1(s, µ, p). Put
Γ̂1(s, µ) , inf
p
sup
m(·)∈X̂1(s,µ,p)
g(m(T )).
Note that if u is a feedback strategy, ∆ is a partition of [s, T ], then the corresponding
stepwise strategy of the first player is given by
ps,u,∆[t,m(·)] , u[ti, m(ti)], t ∈ [ti, ti+1).
Thus,
Γ1(s, µ) ≥ Γ̂1(s, µ). (39)
The stepwise strategies with memory of the second player are introduced in the
same way. A function q : [s, T ]×Ms → Bc is called a stepwise strategy with memory
of the second player on [s, T ] if one can find a partition ∆ = {ti}Ni=0 of [s, T ] such that,
for all m′(·), m′′(·) ∈Ms and t ∈ [s, T ],
q[t,m′(·)] = q[ti, m′(·)] = q[t,m′′(·)] = q[ti, m′′(·)].
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when t ∈ [ti, ti+1), m′(t0) = m′′(t0), . . . , m′(ti) = m′′(ti).
The set of flows of probabilities generated by s, µ and q is denoted by X̂2(s, µ, q).
Put
Γ̂2(s, µ) , sup
q
inf
m(·)∈X̂2(s,µ,q)
g(m(T )).
Clearly, Γ2(s, µ) ≤ Γ̂2(s, µ), Γ̂1(s, µ) ≥ Γ̂2(s, µ). Combining this inequality with (39),
we get
Γ1(s, µ) ≥ Γ̂1(s, µ) ≥ Γ̂2(s, µ) ≥ Γ2(s, µ). (40)
Lemma 7. For any s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td),
Γ1(s, µ) = Γ̂1(s, µ) = Γ̂2(s, µ) = ω∗(s, µ).
Proof. Given ε > 0, for any s, µ, we define the sequence of stepwise strategies with
memory of the second player {qk,εs,µ}∞k=0 such that, for any m(·) ∈ X̂2(s, µ, qk,εs,µ),
g(m(T )) ≥ ωk(s, µ)− ε
k∑
l=0
2−l. (41)
To define q0,εs,µ choose β
0,ε
s,µ ∈ Bc such that
ω0(s, µ) ≤ inf
κ∈D2[β
0,ε
s,µ]
g(m(T, s, µ,κ)) + ε.
Put
q0,εs,µ[t,m(·)] , β0,εs,µ.
Obviously, inequality (41) is fulfilled for k = 0.
Now, assume that the strategies q0,εs,µ, . . . , q
n−1,ε
s,µ are already constructed for any s ∈
[0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td) and satisfy (41) for k = n− 1.
Let rn,εs,µ and β
n,ε
s,µ be such that
ωn(s, µ) ≤ inf
κ∈D2[β
n,ε
s,µ ]
ωn−1(r
n,ε
s,µ, m(r
n,ε
s,µ, s, µ,κ)) + ε2
−n.
Put
qn,εs,µ[t,m(·)] ,
{
βn,εs,µ , t ∈ [s, rn,εs,µ)
qn−1
rn,εs,µ ,m(r
k,ε
s,µ)
[t,m(·)], t ∈ [rn,εs,µ, T ]
We have that
ωn(s, µ) ≤ inf
m(·)∈X̂ (s,µ,qn,εs,µ)
ωn−1(r
n,ε
s,µ, m(r
n,ε
s,µ)) + ε2
−n.
Combining this and the fact that (41) is fulfilled for k = n−1, we obtain the truthfulness
of (41) for k = n.
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Now, let z < ω∗(s, µ). There exists k such that z < ωk(s, µ). Let ε be from
(0, (ωk(s, µ) − z)/2). It follows from (41) that there exists a stepwise strategy of the
second player q = qk,εs,µ such that
inf
m(·)∈X̂ (s,µ,q)
g(m(T )) ≥ ωk(s, µ)− 2ε > z.
This implies that, for any z < ω∗(s, µ),
Γ̂2(s, µ) > z.
Hence,
Γ̂2(s, µ) ≥ ω∗(s, µ).
This, Corollary 1 together with inequality (40) give the conclusion of the lemma.
Lemma 8. For all s ∈ [0, T ], µ ∈ P2(Td), the following inequality holds:
Γ2(s, µ) = Γ̂2(s, µ) = Γ̂1(s, µ) = ω
∗(s, µ).
The proof of this lemma is analogous to the proof of the previous lemma. It is based
on the sequence {ωk} introduced by (10) and (11).
Proof of Theorem 2. The conclusion of Theorem 2 directly follows from Lemmas 5, 6,
7 and 8.
6 Conclusion
In the paper we construct the feedback strategies for the zero-sum first-order mean
field type differential game. The construction relies on the notions of u- and v-stability.
Furthermore, we prove the existence of the value function that is simultaneously u-
and v-stable. These results can be regarded as a mean field analog of the Krasovskii-
Subbotin theory for the finite dimensional differential games.
In the case of finite-dimensional differential game the u-stable (respectively, v-stable)
function is a super- (respectively, sub-) solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi
PDE. The extension of this result to the case of mean field type differential games is
the subject of future work. Note that Cosso and Pham studied the second order mean
field type differential game using nonanticipative strategy (see [18]). In particular, they
proved that the value function in this case is a viscosity solution of the corresponding
Hamilton-Jacobi equation. This raises the question of the equivalence of the feedback
formalization and the approach based on nonaticipative strategies.
In the paper we restrict our attention to the case of zero-sum games. Note that the
case of nonzero-sum games is more complicated. In particular, the existence of Nash
equilibria for finite dimensional differential games is proved only within the punishment
22
approach [27], [39]. Apparently, the punishment strategies can be also used to construct
Nash equilibria for mean field type differential games.
Acknowledgments The author would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable and
helpful comments.
References
[1] N. Ahmed and X. Ding. Controlled McKean-Vlasov equation. Commun Appl Anal,
5:183–206, 2001.
[2] L. Ambrosio, N. Gigli, and G. Savaré. Gradient flows: in metric spaces and in the
space of probability measures. Lectures in Mathematics. ETH Zurich. Birkhäuser,
Basel, 2005.
[3] D. Andersson and B. Djehiche. A maximum principle for SDEs of mean-field type.
Appl Math Optim, 63(3):341–356, 2011.
[4] M. Bardi and I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta. Optimal control and viscosity solutions of
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations. Birkhäuser, Basel, 1996.
[5] E. Bayraktar, A. Cosso, and H. Pham. Randomized dynamic programming prin-
ciple and Feynman-Kac representation for optimal control of McKean-Vlasov dy-
namics. Trans Amer Math Soc, 370:2115–2160, 2018.
[6] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and P. Yam. Mean field games and mean field type
control theory. Springer, New York, 2013.
[7] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and S. Yam. The master equation in mean field theory.
Journal de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées, 103:1441–1474, 2015.
[8] R. Buckdahn, B. Djehiche, and J. Li. A general stochastic maximum principle for
SDEs of mean-field type. Appl Math Optim, 64(2):197–216, 2011.
[9] P. Cardaliaguet and M. Quincampoix. Deterministic differential games under prob-
ability knowledge of initial condition. International Game Theory Rev, 10(1):1–16,
2008.
[10] P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix, and P. Saint-Pierre. Numerical methods for
differential games. In T. P. M. Bardi, T.E.S. Raghavan, editor, Stochastic and
differential games : Theory and numerical methods, Annals of the international
Society of Dynamic Games, pages 177–247. Birkhäuser, 1999.
[11] P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix, and P. Saint-Pierre. Numerical schemes for
discontinuous value functions of optimal control. Set-Valued Anal, 8(1 & 2):111–
126, 2000.
23
[12] P. Cardaliaguet and A. Souquière. A differential game with a blind player. SIAM
J Control Optim, 50(4):2090–2116, 2012.
[13] R. Carmona and F. Delarue. Forward-backward stochastic differential equations
and controlled McKean–Vlasov dynamics. Preprint at arXiv:1303.5835, 2013.
[14] G. Cavagnari and A. Marigonda. Time-optimal control problem in the space of
probability measures. In Large-Scale Scientific Computing, volume 9374 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 109–116, 2015.
[15] G. Cavagnari, A. Marigonda, K. Nguyen, and F. Priuli. Generalized control sys-
tems in the space of probability measures. Set-Valued Var Anal, 2017. published
online.
[16] A. G. C˘encov. On a game problem of converging at a given instant of time. Math
USSR-Sb, 28(3):353–376, 1976.
[17] S. Chistiakov. On solving pursuit game problems. J Appl Math Mech, 41(5):845–
852, 1977.
[18] A. Cosso and P. H. Zero-sum stochastic differential games of generalized mckean-
vlasov type. Preprint at ArXiv:1803.07329, 2018.
[19] C. Dellacherie and P.-A. M. Meyer. Probabilities and potential, volume 29 of North-
Holland Mathematics Studies. North-Holland Publishing Co, Amsterdam, 1978.
[20] B. Djehiche and S. Hamadène. Optimal control and zero-sum stochastic differential
game problems of mean-field type. Preprint at ArXiv::1603.06071, 2016.
[21] R. J. Elliott and N. J. Kalton. Values in differential games. Bull Amer Math Soc,
78(3):427–431, 1972.
[22] A. Friedman. Existence of value and of saddle points for differential games of
pursuit and evasion. J. Differential Equations, 7(1):92–110, 1970.
[23] M. Huang, R. Malhamé, and P. Caines. Nash equilibria for large population linear
stochastic systems with weakly coupled agents. In E. Boukas and M. R.P., editors,
Analysis, Control and Optimization of Complex Dynamic Systems, pages 215–252.
Springer, 2005.
[24] R. Isaacs. Differential Games. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1965.
[25] B. Khaled, M. Meriem, and M. Brahim. Existence of optimal controls for systems
governed by mean-field stochastic differential equations. Afr Stat, 9(1):627–645,
2014.
24
[26] V. N. Kolokoltsov. Nonlinear Markov process and kinetic equations. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
[27] A. Kononenko. On equilibrium positional strategies in nonantagonistic differential
games. Dokl. Akad. Nauk SSSR, 231:285–288, 1976. in Russian.
[28] A. N. Krasovskii and N. N. Krasovskii. Control under lack of information.
Birkhäuser, Boston, 1995.
[29] N. N. Krasovskii and A. I. Subbotin. Game-theoretical control problems. Springer,
New York, 1988.
[30] J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions. Jeux à champ moyen. I. Le cas stationnaire (French)
[Mean field games. I. the stationary case]. C R Math Acad Sci Paris, 343:619–625,
2006.
[31] J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions. Jeux à champ moyen. II. Horizon fini et contrôle
optimal (French) [Mean field games. II. finite horizon and optimal control]. C R
Math Acad Sci Paris, 343:679–684, 2006.
[32] M. Laurière and O. Pironneau. Dynamic programming for mean-field type control.
C R Math Acad Sci Paris, 352(9):707–713, 2014.
[33] H. Pham and X. Wei. Dynamic programming for optimal control of stochastic
McKean-Vlasov dynamics. SIAM J Control Optim, 55:1069–1101, 2017.
[34] H. Pham and X. Wei. Bellman equation and viscosity solutions for mean-field
stochastic control problem. ESAIM Control Optim Calc Var, 2018. accepted.
[35] N. Pogodaev. Optimal control of continuity equations. NoDEA Nonlinear Differ-
ential Equations Appl, 23:Art21, 24 pp., 2016.
[36] A. I. Subbotin. Generalized solutions of first-order PDEs. The dynamical perspec-
tive. Birkhäuser, Boston, 1995.
[37] A. I. Subbotin and A. G. Chentsov. Optimization of guarantee in control problems.
Nauka, Moscow, 1981. in Russian.
[38] A. Sznitman. Topics in propagation of chaos, volume 1464 of Lecture Notes in
Mathematics, pages 165–251. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 1991.
[39] B. Tolwinski, A. Haurie, and G. Leitman. Cooperate equilibria in differential
games. J. Math. Anal. Appl., 112:182–192, 1986.
[40] P. Varaya and J. Lin. Existence of saddle points in differential games. SIAM J
Control, 7(1):142–157, 1969.
25
[41] J. Warga. Optimal control of differential and functional equations. Academic press,
New York, 1972.
26
